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Title:

**METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR IMPROVING EFFICIENCY
OF END-USER CERTIFICATE VALIDATION**

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METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY
OF END-USER CERTIFICATE VALIDATION

Related Co-Pending Application

This application is related to co-pending application entitled "Method and
Apparatus for Use in Determining Validity of a Certificate in a Communication System
Employing Trusted Paths," attorney docket number ENT971120-1, filed on March 8,
1998, having inventors Paul Van Oorschot et al., having serial number 09/040,744 and
assigned to instant assignee.

Field Of The Invention

The invention relates generally to computer systems employing cryptographic
techniques to secure information, and more particularly to network communication
systems using cryptographic techniques that employ certificates.

Background Of The Invention

In typical public key cryptography systems, digital signature key pairs, having a
private key and public key, are often used to authenticate a digital signature of a
subscriber using a software application in order to confirm the identity of the sender of
the message. A subscriber may generally be for example a network computer node, a
software application or user in the security system. In addition to digital signature key
pairs, encryption key pairs are also generally used to encrypt the data being sent from one
subscriber to another subscriber within the computer network. Certificates are typically
generated by a trusted certification authority for the public keys of the private/public key

pair to certify that the keys are genuinely owned by a named subscriber. Standards, such as ISO 9594-8 available from the International Organization for Standardization, define typical certificate content.

5 In a network community, there may be a multitude of different certification authorities and many subscribers. Generally, each subscriber stores a certification authority public key to verify that a trusted certification authority issued the certificate. A public key certificate typically includes a user public key which is bound by the signature of the certification authority to the subscriber name, and other data including expiry data
10 indicating the expiration date or period for the public key certificate. Each sender (subscriber) has a copy of its own certificate. To send an encrypted message, a sender may access a directory, such as an onboard client cache memory or other certificate storage medium to get a copy of an encryption certificate for a specified receiver. When receiving digitally signed data, a receiver obtains a signature verification certificate and
15 determines from the obtained certificate whether the sender has a valid signature. Generally, for a certificate to be considered valid, the digital signature must be valid and there must be no existing expiration or revocation of the certificate by an associated certification authority. Hence, subscribers typically serve as certificate validation units and validate certificates before encrypting information to other subscribers. Similarly,
20 the subscribers also need to verify signature verification certificates before using a public key to validate a subscriber's signature.

In computer network systems that employ cryptography, the certification authority, also referred to herein as the certificate issuing unit, typically issues certificates
25 for subscribers that use the associated certification authority as the primary trusted server. Alternatively, in some systems a trusted subscriber may play the role of a CA in generating and signing certificates of other subscribers. In larger networks, the trust relationships between the certification authorities typically involve multiple certification authorities. Trust relationships between certification authorities determine how
30 certificates issued by one certification authority may be utilized or verified by entities

certified by distinct certification authorities such as those in other networks. Since public key certificates provide a mechanism for obtaining authenticated public keys, provided the verifier has a trusted verification public key of the certification authority which signed the certificate, trusted paths may be established and maintained among the certification

5 authorities and hence subscribers in large computer networks. In the case of multiple certification authorities, a certificate verification unit, such as a subscriber, may wish to obtain an authentic public key by verifying a certificate signed by a certification authority other than one for which it originally possesses a trusted public key. In this case, the verifier may still verify a certificate signed by other certification authorities provided a

10 chain of certificates can be constructed which corresponds to an unbroken chain of trust from the certification authority public key which the verification unit does trust, to the public key it wishes to obtain trust in.

Conventional cryptographic systems, such as many public key cryptography

15 systems, typically use a distributed directory where all certificates and certificate revocation lists are duplicated so each subscriber in a system can access the directory to perform validation. Certificate chains correspond to directed trust paths, also known as certification paths, such as trust relationships among certification authorities where at least one certification authority (CA) has certified another certification authority. A

20 certificate containing the public key of a certification authority is called a CA-certificate. A CA-certificate resulting from one CA certifying another CA is called a cross-certificate, and the process of creating such a certificate is called cross-certification. In this case the CA which signs the certificate is different from the CA whose public key appears within the certificate. A CA-certificate may be either a cross-certificate or a self-

25 signed certificate (where the latter is a CA-certificate signed by the same CA whose public key is within the certificate). Unilateral certification occurs where one certification authority certifies another certification authority but reciprocal certification does not occur. Where a pair of certification authorities certify each other, this is referred to as mutual cross-certification. In this case, the two corresponding cross-certificates are

30 called a cross-certificate pair.

To ensure validity of a subscriber's public key, so that a subscriber may receive or send information along a fully trusted path, the goal for a verification unit is to find a sequence of certificates corresponding to a certification path starting at the certification authority whose public key the subscriber trusts directly (i.e., an anchor certificate issuing unit), and ending at a target certification authority which has signed the certificate of the public key to be verified. If the search for trusted paths is carried out using conventional search techniques, such as breadth first or depth first techniques as known in the art (see for example page 215-218 and 239-244 in "Data Structures and Algorithms", by Alfred V. Aho, John E. Hopcroft, and Jeffrey D. Ullman, published in 1983 by Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, incorporated herein by reference), then a problem arises by way of reduced system performance when large numbers of certification authorities are in the community of interest, and many different combinations of links among certification authorities in various networks (or the same network) exist. In such systems, a verification unit may spend valuable processing time verifying all combinations of links to determine whether a trusted path has been maintained with the certification authority of the verifying verification unit and the certificate issuing unit that issued the target certificate. An inefficiency results when many of the steps involved in an exhaustive search which explores a large number of network nodes, for example in a breadth-first search, end up leading to untrusted or non-existent paths, and therefore unnecessarily consumed computational effort. For example, the validation unit typically has to find the certification paths every time a signed electronic document is received or any time an encryption occurs; checking a large number of possible certification authority paths can be unnecessary and can take long periods of time thereby decreasing the system performance. In large systems, the performance may be so impeded as to render the validation unit impractical.

Hierarchical chain trust structures with one way and/or mutual cross-certification among certificate issuing units typically have verification units verify in the following manner. Each entity or verification unit starts with a trusted public key, for example the

public key of the certificate issuing unit which created its own certificate (anchor CA). The shortest trust chain from any entity is a path in the tree which travels upward from the parent to a least common ancestor of the entity and a target entity, and then onwards back down to the target entity. However, if any CA-certificate or cross-certificate in that particular path has been revoked, has expired, or does not meet policy constraints as required by the anchor CA, that path must be discarded and another trust chain must be sought. In addition, the trust relationships between certificate issuing units may not be strictly hierarchical, in which case other valid paths may exist. Therefore, substantial entity resources can be expended in analyzing all of the possible certification links where a network contains a large number of certification authorities.

Typically, a client engine or other unit that must validate a message from a sending unit, must typically search for, obtain and validate a chain of certificates required to validate a given end-user certificate for which typically requires the client engine to validate all certificates of issuing units that are trusted as determined by cross certificates. This can become an enormous task, particularly with large network systems. The client engine typically repeats this chain construction for each end-user certificate often with little memory of previous constructions. In addition, with conventional systems, when validating an end-user's certificate issued by, for example, a foreign certificate issuer (a certificate issuing unit that is not the validating unit's trust anchor), a client engine will construct a certificate chain from a suitable trust anchor to the end-user certificate. This generally involves retrieval and validation of each cross certificate in the certificate chain. This process is typically repeated for each end-user certificate. Although the client engine may cache cross certificates, and corresponding revocation information pertaining to those certificates, the retrieval, chain construction and validation of each cross certificate must typically still be performed by the client engine in order to validate an end user certificate. The caching operation may save the client engine some network accesses, but typically not the computational mode.

Accordingly, a problem arises since a client engine would be required to build a certificate chain in order to validate an end-user certificate. This can be time consuming, especially from a constrained client engine perspective, based on a potentially large computational and network access costs. In addition, the client engines typically may store the last chain construction but not store beyond the optional caching of cross certificates and corresponding revocation information. In a typical example, for the consecutive revocation of two end-user certificates verifiable using the same certificate chain, the client engine typically still rebuilds the certificate chain and validates each cross certificate from a cache of information when validating the second certificate.

Accordingly, a need exists for an improved method and apparatus for a more efficient end-user certificate validation in systems employing certificates and trusted paths.

Brief Description Of The Drawings

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a trusted public key certificate system employing a signed certificate set generator in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 graphically represents one example of a signed certificate set in accordance with one embodiment of the invention and a signed certificate set revocation list in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating one example of a method for determining validity of a certificate in a communication system employing cross certification among certificate issuing units in accordance with one embodiment of the invention; and

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating another example of an apparatus that employs a signed certificate set centrally for a community of interest in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.

Detailed Description Of The Preferred Embodiment

Briefly, an apparatus and method collects, for a community of interest, at least one cross certificate associated with an anchor certificate issuing unit, and obtains at least one certificate issuing unit public key and an associated unique identifier for a cross-certified certificate issuing unit identified by the at least one cross certificate. For example, a certificate issuing unit, client engine or other suitable unit, searches for one or up to all certification authorities or certificate issuing units that it can reach based on chains of cross certificates to obtain, from one or more cross certificates, a plurality of public keys and associated unique identifiers for certificate issuing unit certificates that are trusted, for example, from the perspective of a given trust anchor. The apparatus selects those obtained certificates that satisfy, for example, some search criteria, such as what policy must be enforced in each cross certificate and CA-certificate, or, for example, the allowed path length or depth that the apparatus is allowed to evaluate. Accordingly, the apparatus and method creates a signed certificate set identifying certificate issuing units determined to be trusted by the anchor certificate issuing unit based on the cross certificates that the apparatus obtained. The signed certificate set includes at least a unique identifier, such as a certificate distinguished name (DN), and public key of each trusted certificate issuing unit.

In one embodiment, the signed certificate set is signed by, for example, the unit performing the validation of the cross certificates, or other suitable trusted unit, and creates the signed certificate set to include general information in the form of a certificate or other suitable data structure that includes, for example, the trust anchor used, a serial number for the certificate or signed certificate set, a validity period for the certificate or signed certificate set, information for each trusted certification authority including, for example, an identifier for each trusted certification authority (e.g., their DN) and an appropriate trusted CA certificate, or, if desirable, just the verification public key of the trusted CA and an identifier for the public key (e.g. the DN of the trusted CA along with, for example, the subject key identifier of the public key in the CA-certificate that contains the public key), or, if desirable, just a secure hash of the public key, along with an

identifier for the public key (e.g. the DN of the trusted CA along with, for example, the subject key identifier in the CA-certificate that contains the public key or the serial number of the CA-certificate).

5 In another embodiment, the method and apparatus includes creating a signed certificate set revocation list that may be archived for future use. As an example, a client engine may, for example, retrieve a signed certificate set, for an appropriate trust anchor, from a central repository or from any suitable source, and store the retrieved signed certificate set until that particular set expires based on its validity period or is revoked.

10 To validate an end-user certificate, the client engine searches in the signed certificate set for the identifier of the public key that signed the end user certificate (e.g. the DN of the CA that issued the end-user certificate along with the authority key identifier of the end-user certificate). If found, the CA certificate or simply the public key corresponding to the issuer of the end-user certificate is used to validate the signature on the end-user
15 certificate. If not found, then the client engine may indicate that the certificate is not trustworthy or may choose to use other means to validate the certificate. Accordingly, a client engine or receiving engine may validate end entity certificates without requiring chain construction or obtaining chain information, such as CA-certificates or cross certificates, or validation of CA-certificates or cross-certificates by the client engine. If
20 the client engine can cache the signed certificate set, or import certificates directly from the trusted signed certificate set into its own certificate trust list, a client engine can more efficiently validate messages from senders in a given system.

 In another embodiment, the method and apparatus centrally creates a plurality of
25 signed certificate sets on a per anchor certificate issuing unit basis wherein each signed certificate set contains at least, for example, a signed set of unique identifiers and associated public keys of each certificate issuing unit trusted by an anchor certificate issuing unit. If desired, instead of storing, for example, the public keys or the CA certificates of trusted certificate issuing units in the signed certificate set, an identifier of

such information (e.g. a DN of the certificate issuing unit and a key identifier) along with a secure hash of that information may also be used.

If desired, the signed certificate set is created by removing the CAs that do not meet specified policy requirements based on, for example, policy identification data present in the certificate associated with the CA being validated, in the cross-certificates, in the CA-certificate of the trust anchor, or in the attribute certificate associated with a particular of end-user of group of end-users

FIG. 1 depicts one example of a trusted public key certificate system 100 that employs at least one signed certificate set in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. The system 100 includes a number of certificate issuing units 102a-102n such as certification authorities, for issuing public key certificates, attribute certificates or any other suitable certificates or data structures. The system 100 also includes a plurality of signed certificate set generators 104a-104n, each associated with a respective certificate issuing unit 102a-102n, and a plurality of message receiving units, such as client units 106a-106n. In this example, certificate issuing unit 102a is the anchor certificate issuing unit for client units 106a and 106b. Similarly, the certificate issuing unit 102c is the anchor certificate issuing unit for client units 106c and 106d, and certificate issuing unit 102n is an anchor certificate issuing unit for client unit 106n (additional or fewer). Certificate issuing units and client units may also be included in the system, but are not shown. In this example, the client units 106a-106n may be, for example, but are not limited to, software applications, or any suitable processing unit that contains, for example, a cryptographic engine that can validate certificates or otherwise send encrypted messages to other client units in the system.

By way of illustration, each of the certificate issuing units 102a-102n is cross certified with one or more certificate issuing units, as known in the art. This is illustrated by cross certificate lines 108a-108n. Each client unit 106a-106n communicates with its respective anchor certificate issuing unit via a suitable communication link illustrated

generally at 110. This may include, but is not limited to, for example, a bus, network link, Internet link, wireless link or any other suitable communication link.

Each signed certificate set generator 104a-104n, may be a server or, for example,
5 a software application, discrete logic, a plurality of processing units, or any other suitable structure that is operative to collect a plurality of cross certificates associated with at least one anchor certificate issuing unit that is operative to obtain all certificate issuing unit certificates for all of the cross certified certificate issuing units identified by the cross certificates' interest. The signed certificate set generators 104a-104n are operative to
10 create a signed certificate set (SCS) identifying certificate issuing units determined to be trusted by the anchor certificate issuing unit, based on the cross certificates, wherein the signed certificate set includes at least a unique identifier, such as a distinguished name (DN), and a public key for each trusted certificate issuing unit that has been determined to meet certain trust criteria. As used herein, the public key of each trusted certificate
15 issuing unit includes any index to such public keys to provide, for example, an indirect link (e.g. a DN of the trusted certificate issuing unit and a key identifier of the public key, along with a secure hash of the public key)

By way of illustration, certificate issuing unit 102c will be described although the same operations are performed by the other certificate issuing units in the community of
20 interest. The signed certificate set generator 104c is shown as being incorporated as part of the certificate issuing unit 102c, but may be a separate server or other suitable device that performs the operations described herein. The signed certificate generator 104c after creating the signed certificate sets, stores the signed certificate sets (SCS) (see, e.g., FIG. 2) and publishes them in an SCS repository 112 such as an X.500-type directory or other
25 suitable store that is accessible by the client units associated with the particular certificate issuing unit or that are associated with other certificate issuing units. As shown, client units 106c and 106d access the SCS repository 112 as indicated by dashed lines 114a and 114b. This access may be through any suitable form as known in the art for accessing, for example, X.500-type directories. Accordingly, the client units 106c and 106d are in
30 operative communication with the signed certificate set generator 104c via

associated public key 206 (or reference the public key 206a, for example, a secure hash of the public key). Anchor certification issuing unit 102a will then collect additional cross certificates that include, for example, nested cross certificates (chained cross certificates) from the plurality of certificate issuing units 102c and 102n, for example, via the cross certificate relationships 108a and 108n, respectively. As known in the art, the cross certificates via relationship 108b may be stored in one or more data repositories, such as an X.500 directory, associated with the anchor certificate issuing units 102a and 102b. The data repository associated with the anchor certificate issuing unit 102b may also include cross certificates between certificate issuing 102b and 102n via the cross certificate relationship 108n, as known in the art.

By collecting and validating the plurality of cross certificates associated with certificate issuing units 102b-102n, identified by cross certificates, for example, in the data repository, the signed certificate set generator 104 creates the signed certificate set 200. For example, the list 202 would also include the unique identifier associated with certificate issuing unit 102n and its associated public key if there is a trust relationship via cross certificates with certificate issuing unit 102b which is trusted by the anchor certificate issuing unit 102a via cross certificate relationship 108b. Accordingly, the list 202 includes a sequence of cross certificates and/or just the public keys (or information sufficient to retrieve the public keys in a secure way, for example the public key identifier and a secure hash of the public key) of the trusted certificate issuing units determined to be valid via cross certification relationships.

In addition, the signed certificate set generator 104 does not include in the list 202 CA's that do not meet policy criteria. For example, if a trust relationship existed between certificate issuing units based on, for example, a cross certification relationship but one of the certificate issuing units did not have acceptable policy criteria, for example, did not provide certificates to its respective client units using a suitable strength encryption algorithm, for example, the signed certificate set generator would not allow the certificate issuing unit and its associated public key to be listed in list 202. Pruning

other certificate issuing units, this additional depth level may or may not be used so that some certificate issuing units may not be evaluated for inclusion in the list 202.

The signed certificate set 200 may also include a signed certificate set serial number 210 which is updated each time a new SCS 200 is published, for example, in an SCS repository or X.500 directory. The SCS 200 may also include an SCS validity period 212 that defines the life of the SCS 200 after which time the SCS 200 is no longer trustworthy. It may also contain the date and time at which the SCS generator expects to issue the next SCS. It may also contain the identifier of a distribution point where the client may find revocation information for this particular SCS. For example, revocation information may be distributed by the SCS generator in the form of a SCS revocation list posted at a particular entry in an X.500 directory. For example, the format and method of distribution of the SCS revocation list may be similar to those of the X.509 certificate revocation list (CRL), as known in the art. The SCS 200 may also be signed to form the signed certificate set so that it is given a level of trust that is trusted by the client unit. The digital signature 214 results from the digitally signing of the created signed certificate set to provide a trusted signed certificate set for use by a client unit. The digital signature 214 may be, for example in this case, the digital signature of the anchor certification authority 102a or whichever authority is directly trusted by a respective client unit. A third party notary or other third party signatory may also digitally sign the SCS if desired. Also if desired, the SCS may include a policy identifier as noted above, used to create the signed certificate set such that certain policies are verified so that listed certification issuing units and associated public keys are included only from those certification authorities that comply with the identified policy information . The SCS 200 may also include an SCS identifier 216 that represents that it is an SCS associated with, in this case, certificate issuing unit 202a. This may be useful, for example, where SCS's are centrally stored for access by client units associated with differing trust anchor certificate issuing units such that a client unit may request and obtain an SCS defined by the SCS ID so that it only obtains its anchor certificate issuing unit. Once generated, the

SCS is published and accessible by a plurality of different client units such as being published in the SCS repository 112 or in another suitable fashion.

The signed certificate set generator 104c or other suitable entity also may generate a signed certificate set revocation list 218 containing at least an identifier 220 of at least one signed certificate set that has been revoked by, for example, the signed certificate set generator 104a, or other suitable authority, or containing an identifier 220 that denotes that no signed certificate set has been revoked. The identifier 220 may be, for example, a list of SCS serial numbers 210 of revoked SCS for selected anchor certificate issuing units. This may be done, for example, via a certificate revocation list methodology as known in the art. The SCS revocation list 220 includes a digital signature 222 of, for example, the certificate issuing unit 102a or signed certificate set generator 104a or whichever entity is a trusted revoker of signed certificate sets. Accordingly, when a client unit requests an SCS from a respective repository it may also obtain the SCS revocation list 218 to indicate whether it can trust a cached or otherwise obtained SCS.

FIG. 3 illustrates a method for determining validity of a certificate by a recipient, (e.g., client) using, for example, the signed certificate set. As shown in block 300, the method begins with the start of the precomputation of an SCS on a per certificate issuing unit basis. This is done, for example, as shown in block 302 by collecting a plurality of cross certificates associated with a given trust anchor certificate issuing unit from, for example, an X.500 directory or other suitable storage medium or mediums. As shown in block 304, the method includes validating, by for example, the signed certificate set generator, each cross certificate associated with the anchor CA to see if the certificate is valid. As shown in block 306, the method includes storing each valid certificate, or at least an identifier and public key of a validated (i.e., trusted) certificate issuing unit into the list 202 for a first level of trust, meaning a direct cross certification with another certificate issuing unit.

generates the SCS's for all CAs in the community of interest and need not perform this operation each time a message needs to be validated by a client unit.

FIG. 4 illustrates an alternative embodiment wherein, for example, a single signed certificate set generator obtains and generate all SCSs for all certificate issuing units in a community of trust. As such, central SCS generator 400 centrally creates a plurality of signed certificate sets 402, on a per anchor certificate issuing unit basis. Each signed certificate set 402 includes at least a list of unique identifiers and associated public keys of each certificate issuing unit trusted by their respective anchor certificate issuing unit.

The plurality of SCS's is then published in, for example, a common repository accessible by a plurality of different client units 404a-404n. Each SCS includes a digital signature of the generating trusted entity and a signed certificate set identifier associated with a given anchor certificate issuing unit. Preferably, although not required, each SCS includes a signed certificate set serial number generated each time a certificate set is published.. Furthermore, each SCS might contain one or more lists of CA's, each list representing a set of CA's that are trusted on the basis of trust in a particular trust anchor or in a set of trust anchors and possibly with the application of a particular set of policy constraints.

As with the system in FIG. 1, a client unit verifies the digital signature on an obtained signed certificate set to determine if the signed certificate set is valid. The client unit verifies the signature on the SCS revocation list and checks whether the SCS was revoked and whether the signed certificate set needs to be regenerated for the anchor certificate issuing unit. For example, if the signed certificate set that has been cached by a client unit appears on an SCS revocation list, the client unit may request a new SCS directly from its anchor certificate issuing unit, or may again access the SCS repository to obtain an updated SCS for a given anchor certificate issuing unit. If the client unit deems that a fresh or more recently issued SCS should be used, the client unit may request that the SCS generating unit issue a fresh SCS, even if the SCS cached by the client does not appear on any SCS revocation list. The SCS generating unit may or may not respond

immediately to client requests for a fresh SCS by generating a new SCS, sending it to the client unit, or posting it into an X.500 directory or other certificate repository. The SCS generating unit may respond to client requests based on criteria that the SCS generating unit itself applies; for example, it may generate and distribute a fresh SCS if it receives
5 requests from sufficiently many client units within a certain time interval. Alternatively, for example, the SCS generating unit may simply generate a fresh SCS at periodic intervals. Alternatively, for example, the SCS generating unit may generate a fresh SCS when one or more of the trust relationships in the plurality of CA certificates or cross-certificates has changed; for example, if one or more of those certificates has been
10 revoked. Also, the certificate set revocation list may also be posted into a X.500 directory or other repository to be accessible to a plurality of clients.

As described herein, the operations of the signed certificates generator may be carried out by one or more processing units based on executable instructions that may be
15 stored, for example, in a storage medium containing memory that contains executable instructions that when read by one or more processing units causes the one or more processing units to perform the operations described herein. In addition, the operations of the client units, including, but not limited to, obtaining SCSs, and verifying the SCSs in response to desiring to approve a received message, may be performed by one or more
20 processing units associated with a client unit. Accordingly, executable instructions may be stored on a storage medium so that the client unit can carry out the operations described herein. The storage medium may include, but is not limited to, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, including CD ROMs, distributed storage such as via the Internet, or any other suitable memory containing the requisite executable instructions.

25 Accordingly, based on the above apparatus and methods, the efficiency of validation of end-user certificates can be greatly improved by providing a client simply with a list of public keys associated with trusted certification authorities thereby eliminating the need for a client unit to validate each certificate in a chain of certificates
30 each time a message is received. In addition, the above method and apparatus provides,

among other advantages, the elimination of the need for a certificate issuing unit to continually perform validation of certificate chains since a signed certificate set generator may perform the operation for all certificate issuing units in a community of interest. Also, a signed certificate set generator may be programmed based on certain desired

5 policy criteria to construct a signed certificate set starting from any number of root certificates. The signed certificate set generator may construct one or more SCS's each one based on a particular set of policy criteria and a particular anchor CA, or it may place one or more lists of trusted CA's within a single SCS, each list being constructed based on a particular set of policy criteria and trust anchor or anchors. Each SCS is managed

10 such as management of its validity period and potentially expiry period. The SCS includes, for example, a list of trusted certificate issuing units or public keys indexed, for example, by appropriate identifiers such as the DN from the validated certificates. The user of the SCS allows the validation of end entity certificates without requiring chain construction or validation of CA certificates by a client unit. Validation of the SCS and

15 validation of the sender or receiver's certificate using the public key in the SCS is all that is needed. Capability for the client unit to either cache the SCS or import the certificates or public keys to form a list into its own certificate trust lists is also quite useful.

It should be understood that the implementation of other variations and

20 modifications of the invention in its various aspects will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art, and that the invention is not limited by the specific embodiments described. It is therefore contemplated to cover by the present invention, any and all modifications, variations, or equivalents that fall within the spirit and scope of the basic underlying principles disclosed and claimed herein.